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ABSTRACT 
 
We empirically investigate whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) is really profitable in 
Korea. Specifically, we examine whether a potential measurement problem of CSR score 
measured by KEJI (Korea Economic Justice Institute) index affects the relationship between CSR 
and corporate financial performance (CFP). The empirical results regarding the relationship 
between CSR and CFP in prior studies have been inconsistent. Although some studies (e.g. 
Waddock & Graves, 1997) point out that the potential measurement problem of CSR score is 
likely to be an important factor to resolve the issue of mixed results, CSR measurement problem to 
date draws little attention from researchers particularly in Korea setting. We suspect that prior 
studies that report positive relationship between CSR and CFP using KEJI index is biased upward 
due to potential measurement problem of KEJI index that includes operating performance 
component. To examine this issue, we employ an adjusted CSR score which excludes operating 
performance component included in the unadjusted CSR score to mitigate measurement problem 
that can show a positive upward bias in the relationship between CSR and CFP in the prior 
studies. 
 
We employ the sample data of 1,301 firm-year observations of manufacturing firms listed in Korea 
Stock Price Index (KOSPI) market during 2005-2010. Using adjusted CSR score, we find that the 
positive CSR-CFP relationship significantly weakens compared to unadjusted CSR score. This 
result remains robust after we perform various sensitivity tests. This study suggests that CSR 
measurements problem is likely to distort the relationship between CSR and CFP in Korea setting. 
This study’s main contribution is to provide evidence on the measurement problem of KEJI CSR 
score in the study on the relationship between CSR and CFP. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
his paper examines whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) is really profitable in Korea. 
Specifically, we investigate whether the relationship between CSR and corporate financial 
performance (CFP) is affected by potential measurement problem of CSR scores measured by KEJI 
(Korea Economic Justice Institute) index in Korea setting. During the last four decades, stakeholders such as 
customers, employees, suppliers, and community groups have been asking firms to undertake CSR activities 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). Some firms have proactively made an effort to meet these demands by investing 
more resources to CSR activities. Other firms have resisted insisting that investments on CSR activities do not 
benefit them to accomplish their goal to maximize profits. 
 
Reflecting these concerns in the business, researchers have primarily explored whether the relationship 
between CSR and CFP exists. However, they have not reached agreement on the definite relationship between two 
variables in international setting (Cochran & Wood, 1984; Akpinar et al., 2008; Hull & Rothenberg, 2008; Aguinis 
& Glavas, 2012) as well as Korea setting (J.-S. Choi et al., 2010; Heo & Chung, 2010; Jang & Choi, 2010; Na & 
Hong, 2011). Despite the inconsistent results, in Korea setting, the majority of studies to date report the positive 
relationship between CSR and CFP.  
T 
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Does CSR really contribute to enhancing firm value or increasing operating income in Korea setting? Is 
there no measurement problem in CSR score? If it exists, does the positive relationship maintain when adjusted CSR 
score is used? Waddock and Graves (1997) suggest CSR measurement problem is related to mixed results on the 
relationship between CSR and CFP. In Korea setting, prior studies have been widely employing KEJI CSR score to 
measure the level of a firm’s CSR activities (e.g. Black et al., 2006; J.-S. Choi et al., 2010; Heo & Chung, 2010; Oh 
et al., 2011; B. B. Choi et al., 2013; H. Choi & Moon, 2013).  
 
We suspect that prior studies that report positive relationship between CSR and CFP using KEJI index is 
biased upward due to potential measurement problem of KEJI index that includes operating performance 
component. Then, our research question is “Does KEJI index have the measurement problem to proxy for the level 
of CSR activities in explaining the CSR-CFP relation? If yes, does the measurement problem significantly affect the 
positive relationship between CSR and CFP reported in prior studies? Given the strong impact of CSR score on 
CFP, it is meaningful to assess the measurement problem of KEJI CSR score. However, little study to date has 
addressed the KEJI index measurement problem in Korea setting. Moreover, C. H. Kim et al. (2013, p. 2588) point 
out that Korean firms’ CSR activities tend to be a short term version with public relations focus because CSR in 
Korea is driven by government and societal regulative and normative pressures. This implies that the relationship 
between CSR and CFP in Korea is not necessarily positive. 
 
Although prior studies employ unadjusted CSR score to measure a firm’s CSR activities, we need to use 
adjusted CSR score to correct the potential measurement problem of unadjusted CSR score for the following 
reasons. First, unadjusted CSR scores have the measurement problem to proxy for CSR activities in the study on the 
relationship between CSR and CFP because unadjusted CSR score contains operating performance related measures 
(i.e. economic development contribution)i. If operating performance measures are included, they may result in 
positive upward bias for the relationship between CSR and CFP. For example, if a firm realizes high earnings, it is 
likely to receive better CSR scores simply because of high earnings, leading to the positive upward bias for the 
relationship between CSR and CFP. In order to correct the measurement problem and calculate the adjusted CSR 
score, we exclude operating performance measures (i.e. economic development contribution) from the unadjusted 
CSR score.  
 
Second, KLD ratings widely used for CSR studies (e.g. Margolis & Walsh, 2001; Mattingly & Berman, 
2006) in the U.S. do not include operating performance measures to proxy for the extent of the firm’s CSR 
activities. That is, the KLD ratings are not substantially influenced by a firm’s financial success (Mattingly & 
Berman, 2006, p. 21). Specifically, KLD ratings consist of community relations, employee relations, environment, 
product, treatment of women and minorities, military contracts, nuclear power, and South Africa (Graves & 
Waddock, 1994, p. 1038).ii  
 
Third, the KEJI institution decides to exclude the economic development contribution category from the 
revised KEJI index in 2012, because economic development contribution category tends to be related to operating 
performance and thereby giving better scores to firms realizing high earnings (KEJI, 2012, p. 15).iii In this study, we 
examine whether adjusted CSR score weakens the positive relationship between CSR and CFP reported in the prior 
studies in Korea setting. 
 
We use the sample of 1,301 firm-year observations of Korean listed manufacturing firms during the period 
of 2005-2010. Both adjusted and unadjusted KEJI CSR scores are used to proxy for the level of firm’s CSR 
activities. We use Tobin’s Q and ROA to measure a firm’s financial performance. We find that based on unadjusted 
CSR score, CSR activities are positively and significantly associated with Tobin’s Q and ROA consistent with prior 
studies (e.g. Jang & Choi, 2010), whereas based on adjusted CSR score, the positive CSR-CFP relation becomes 
weaker or insignificant depending on sample periods. These results remain robust after various sensitivity tests. 
Accordingly, this result implies that the well-known positive CSR-CFP relationship in Korea setting might be 
exaggerated due to the potential measurement problem of CSR score. 
 
This study primarily contributes to the literature on the relationship between CSR and CFP by providing 
the evidence that adjusted KEJI CSR score significantly weakens the positive relationship between unadjusted KEJI 
score and CFP documented in prior studies. Our evidence has an important implication to researchers in that we 
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show the importance of adjusting the original CSR score to proxy for the proper level of CSR activities in Korea 
setting depending on the research question in the study. Since KEJI CSR score has many dimensions, it is crucial for 
the researcher to adjust the CSR score by excluding a specific component if that component is known to have a 
significant relationship with the variable of interest. For example, Yongtae Kim et al. (2012) show that governance 
components in KLD ratings should be excluded when studying the relationship between CSR and earnings 
management because governance is known to control a firm’s earnings management. Similarly, Cho and Chun 
(2015) adjust KEJI CSR score by excluding governance components in the study on the relationship between CSR 
and real activities earnings management in Korea setting. We thus suggest that adjusted KEJI CSR score that 
excludes performance component needs to be employed in the future CSR study especially in studies dealing with 
CFP. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a literature review and research 
question. Section III describes sample data, research design, and measurements of variables. Section IV discusses 
the empirical results and the results of sensitivity tests. Section V summarizes and concludes the study. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Figure 1 provides the research framework of this study. This study’s primary objective is to examine 
whether the adjusted KEJI CSR score that excludes the performance component from the original CSR score 
weakens the positive relationship between CSR and performance using original KEJI CSR score in prior studies in 
Korea setting. The corporate financial performance is measured by TOBINQ and ROA. 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
 
 
The Relationship Between CSR and CFP 
 
Examining the relationship between CSR and CFP has been a lively topic since 1970s. There are various 
arguments in terms of the relationship between CSR and CFP. One view is based on shareholder theory proposed by 
Friedman (1970) which supports the argument that CSR activities can be costs and, thus, against shareholders’ 
wealth. This argument is closely related to maximizing shareholder value. However, the contrasting view is based on 
stakeholder theory proposed by Freeman (1984), which supports the contention that CSR activities produce more 
benefits than costs through a good relationship with a firm’s diverse stakeholders.iv 
 
Although the relationship between CSR and CFP has been a lively addressed research topic since the 
1970s (Beurden & Gössling, 2008), researchers have not reached consensus on the relationship between two 
variables (Cochran & Wood, 1984; Akpinar et al., 2008; Hull & Rothenberg, 2008; Perrini et al., 2011; Aguinis & 
Glavas, 2012). These studies imply that CSR activities may have a diverse effect on CFP. For example, Barnett 
(2007, p. 801) argues that equal CSR investment by different firms, or even the same firm at different points in time, 
does not produce equal amount of financial gain, as implied by thirty years of inconsistent findings. 
 
Prior CSR studies in Korea on the relationship between CSR and CFP also show mixed results. Table 1 
shows the summary of the prior studies’ empirical results on the relationship between CSR and CFP in Korea 
setting. Three relationships (i.e. positive, negative, and neutral) between CSR and CFP exist even though majority 
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studies document the positive relationship between CSR and CFP mainly measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA (C. 
Kim, 2009; Heo & Chung, 2010; Jang & Choi, 2010; Y Kim & Wee, 2011; Kook & Kang, 2011; Na & Hong, 
2011). Specifically, several studies (C. Kim, 2009; Jang & Choi, 2010; Kook & Kang, 2011) document that the 
relationship between CSR and Tobin’s Q is positive. Further, other studies (Jang & Choi, 2010) report that the 
relationship between CSR and ROA is positive. In addition, we also observe that KEJI index is widely used to 
measure the level of CSR activities for Korean public firms. 
 
In international setting, mainly the U.S settings, a number of researchers document the positive 
relationship between CSR and CFP (Bragdon Jr & Marlin, 1972; Moskowitz, 1972; Spicer, 1978; McGuire et al., 
1988; Waddock & Graves, 1997; Dowell et al., 2000; Ruf et al., 2001; Schnietz & Epstein, 2005). As well, Goll and 
Rasheed (2004) contend that the most recent developments in CSR studies show a more positive linkage between 
CSR and CFP than does earlier research. Positive relationship implies that the CSR costs incurred are small and the 
CSR benefits are large. In the review studies on the relationship between CSR and CFP, Peloza (2009) summarizes 
that 68%, 15%, and 22% of 159 articles published for the year of 1972-2008 report a positive, negative, and mixed 
relationship, respectively. Recently, using 588 journal articles and 102 books from 1970 to 2011, Aguinis and 
Glavas (2012) examine the relationship between CSR and CFP. The results show that there is a small, but a positive 
relationship between CSR activities and CFP. Meanwhile, Beurden and Gössling (2008) show 68% of the positive 
relationship based on 34 studies. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the Prior Empirical Studies on the Relationship between CSR and CFP 
Author (Year) Sample firms (Sample period) CSR measures CFP Measures 
Positive relationship 
C. Kim (2009) KOSPI 1,116 firm-years (1999-2007) Sustainable management 
index 
Tobin's Q 
Heo and Chung (2010) KOSPI 140 firm-years (selected more 
than 3 times in a row by KEJI and 
selected for most admired firms in 
Korea by KMAC)(2004-2008) 
among upper 200 firms disclosed by 
KEJI 
KEJI Index Price to book value ratio 
(PBR) 
Jang and Choi (2010) KOSPI 130 firms (selected more than 
5 times in the upper 200 firms during 
8 years of sample period) (1998-
2005) among upper 200 firms 
disclosed by KEJI 
KEJI Index Return on assets (ROA, 
EBIT/Total assets),  
Tobin's Q 
Y Kim and Wee (2011) KOSPI 1,238 firm-years (2002-2008) 
among upper 200 firms disclosed by 
KEJI 
KEJI Index Return on assets (ROA) 
(Net income/Total 
assets) 
Kook and Kang (2011) KOSPI 503 firm-years (2008-2009) KRX SRI Index Tobin's Q 
Na and Hong (2011) KOSPI 74 firms (selected 5 times in 
a row in the upper 200 firms) (2004-
2008) among upper 200 firms 
disclosed by KEJI 
KEJI Index (Employee 
satisfaction and economic 
development contribution 
measures) 
Tobin's Q 
Negative relationship 
Na and Hong (2011) KOSPI 74 firms (selected 5 times in 
a row in the upper 200 firms) (2004-
2008) among upper 200 firms 
disclosed by KEJI 
KEJI Index (Environmental 
protection measure) 
Tobin's Q 
Neutral relationship 
J.-S. Choi et al. (2010) KOSPI 1,222 firm-years (2002-2008) 
among upper 200 firms disclosed by 
KEJI 
KEJI Index Return on assets 
(ROA, EBIT/Total 
assets), Return on 
equity (ROE), Tobin’s 
Q 
Y Kim and Wee (2011) KOSPI 1,238 firm-years (2002-2008) 
among upper 200 firms disclosed by 
KEJI 
KEJI Index Stock return 
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Research Question 
 
Based on recent review studies for CSR research published during 1970s-2000s, several studies (Beurden 
& Gössling, 2008; Peloza, 2009; Aguinis & Glavas, 2012) document that the majority of prior studies support a 
positive relationship. Moreover, according to the studies using Korean firms’ data shown in Table 2, the majority of 
studies also support a positive relationship using both Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
 
However, C. H. Kim et al. (2013, p. 2588) point out that Korean firms’ CSR activities tend to be a short 
term version with public relations focus because CSR in Korea is mostly driven by government and societal 
regulative and normative pressures, implying that the relationship between CSR in Korea and CFP is not likely to be 
positive. Needless to say, CSR score as an independent variable of interest plays an important role in determining 
the relationship between CSR and CFP. Waddock and Graves (1997) point out CSR measurement problem as a 
reason for mixed results on the relationship between CSR and CFP. In Korea setting, although KEJI index is widely 
employed in CSR studies (J.-S. Choi et al., 2010; Heo & Chung, 2010; Jang & Choi, 2010; Y Kim & Wee, 2011; Na 
& Hong, 2011; Oh et al., 2011; B. B. Choi et al., 2013; H. Choi & Moon, 2013), to our knowledge, to date there is 
no attempt to assess the measurement problem of KEJI index in the study on the relationship between CSR and CFP. 
 
If there is a potential measurement problem in CSR score due to operating performance measures included 
in unadjusted CSR scores, the relationship between unadjusted CSR score and CFP is expected to be upward biased 
because of high correlation between operating performance measures and CFP. We predict that measurement 
problem of CSR score is likely to lead to the spurious positive results on CSR-CFP relationship in Korean setting. In 
this study, we assess the impact of the measurement problem of KEJI index on CFP by performing empirical 
analysis adjusted KEJI index obtained by excluding performance component from the original CSR index. Hence, 
we provide the following research question. 
 
Research Question: Does adjusted KEJI CSR score weaken the positive relationship between CSR and CFP 
compared to unadjusted KEJI CSR score? 
 
To test this research question, we use not only unadjusted CSR score but also adjusted CSR score. Further, 
Tobin’s Q and ROA is used as CFP measures because Tobin’s Q (C. Kim, 2009; Jang & Choi, 2010; Kook & Kang, 
2011; Na & Hong, 2011) and ROA (J.-S. Choi et al., 2010; Jang & Choi, 2010) are widely used in the prior studies 
as shown in Table 1. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Sample Data 
 
We employ KEJI CSR score to proxy for the level of firm’s CSR activities.v The KEJI CSR 
scores(maximum total 75points) consists of seven categories of the KEJI Index measures: soundness (20 points), 
fairness (11 points), social contribution (7 points), customer protection and satisfaction (7 points), environmental 
protection activity (10 points), employee satisfaction (10 points), and economic development contribution (10 
points)vi (KEJI, 2011)vii (refer to Appendix B). 
 
KEJI CSR scores appear to represent the level of firm’s CSR activities objectively to some degree because 
the measurement methods are comparable to the KLD ratings (Oh et al., 2011). For other variables, we collect the 
data from KISVALUE, which is provided by NICE GROUPviii, one of the largest financial data providers in Korea, 
and widely used in the academic research. Data availability restricts the sample to 1,301 firm-year observations of 
the listed Korean firms. 
 
Research Design 
 
In order to capture the relationship between the level of CSR activities measured by KEJI index (i.e. 
adjusted and unadjusted CSR score) and CFP measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA, we estimate the following 
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multivariate regression Equations (1) and (2). ADJ_ROA variable is omitted in Equation (2) because ROA and 
ADJ_ROA are highly correlated. 
 
TOBINQi.t = α0 + α1 CSRi,t (or ADJ_CSRi,t) + α2 SIZEi,t + α3 LEVERAGEi,t  
+ α4 ADJ_ROAi,t  + α5 RISKi,t + α6 GOVERNi,t  
+ α7 FIRM_AGEi,t + ∑IND + ∑YEAR + εi,t ………  (1) 
 
ROAi.t = α0 + α1 CSRi,t (or ADJ_CSRi,t) + α2 SIZEi,t + α3 LEVERAGEi,t  
+ α4 RISKi,t + α5 GOVERNi,t + α6 FIRM_AGEi,t  
+ ∑IND + ∑YEAR + εi,t ……… (2) 
 
where, for company i in period t: 
 
Dependent Variables 
TOBINQ = (market value of common and preferred stock + long term liabilities) / book value of total assets, at fiscal 
year-end in period t; and 
ROA = operating income/total assets at fiscal year-end in period t. 
Variable of Interest 
CSR = natural logarithm of unadjusted total CSR scores measured by KEJI Index (refer to Appendix B); and 
ADJ_CSR = natural logarithm of adjusted total CSR scores (unadjusted total CSR score – economic development 
contribution). 
Control Variables 
SIZE = natural logarithm of total asset; 
LEVERAGE = total liability / total assets; 
ADJ_ROA = industry mean–adjusted ROA in the previous year (ROA = income before extraordinary items / lagged total 
assets); 
RISK 
GOVERN 
= standard deviation of prior five years EBITDA / total assets;1) 
= natural logarithm of governance score provided by Korea Corporate Governance Service; 
FIRM_AGE = natural logarithm of (1 + the number of years since the firm's establishment); 
IND = industry dummy based on two-digit Korea standard industry classification code; and 
YEAR = year dummy. 
1) EBITDA stands for earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
 
Measurement of Variables 
 
Although prior studies employ unadjusted CSR scores to measure a firm’s CSR activities, we additionally 
use adjusted CSR scores for the following reasons. Unadjusted CSR score contains operating performance related 
measures (i.e. economic development contribution). If operating performance measures are included, they may 
cause to result in upward bias for the relationship between CSR and CFP because economic development 
contribution measure is highly and positively correlated with CFP as shown in Table 2 below (0.37, p<0.01 with 
TOBINQ; 0.23, p<0.01 with ROA). Thus, we exclude operating performance measures (i.e. economic development 
contribution) from the original unadjusted CSR scores to measure adjusted CSR scores. Tobin’s Q is measured using 
market value of equity plus liabilities divided by book value total assets. ROA is operating income divided by total 
assets as of fiscal year end.  
 
Table 2. Correlation Coefficients between ECONO_CONT and TOBINQ and ROA 
 ECONO_CONT TOBINQ ROA ECONO_CONT 1   TOBINQ 0.37** 1  ROA 0.23** 0.42** 1 
n 1,301 1,301 1,301 
Pearson correlation coefficients are shown below the diagonal. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent and 1 
percent levels on a two–tailed test, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
In order to avoid the problems of correlated omitted variables related to the firm’s financial performance, 
we include control variables that may affect the relationship between CSR and CFP. First, firm size (SIZE) is widely 
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used in empirical research as a control variable (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Shin & Stulz, 1998; Seifert et al., 2004). 
Arlow and Gannon (1982) suggest that based on the review of several prior studies, organization size is an important 
factor in CSR studies. Black et al. (2006) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that firm size is negatively related to 
the financial performance. However, if economy of scale exists, a large firm is positively associated with financial 
performance because it has bargaining power against suppliers and buyers (Porter, 1985). Moreover, a large firm 
tends to disclose much information about itself, leading to decreasing information uncertainty about itself and 
increasing firm value (C. Kim, 2009; Kook & Kang, 2011). Prior studies (Stanwick & Stanwick, 1998; Moore, 
2001) find a significant positive relationship between firm size and CFP. In this study, given that sample firms are 
listed firms that have relatively large size and are likely to realize the economy of scale and disclose much 
information, we predict that firm size is positively associated with financial performance. 
 
Second, financial leverage (LEVERAGE) equals total liabilities divided by total assets as of fiscal year 
end. Financial leverage affects a firm’s value such as Tobin’s Q (De, 1992; Waddock & Graves, 1997). If a firm’s 
leverage is high, it is highly likely to face financial difficulties. This financial risk may lead to higher financing 
costs, thereby resulting in negative association with the firm value. However, if a firm’s leverage is not high, interest 
expense contributes to decreasing its financing costs because of tax deduction effects on interest payment, thereby 
resulting in a higher financial performance. Thus, given that this study’s sample observations are listed and low 
leverage firms, we predict a positive sign of the coefficient. In contrast, with respect to ROA, if financial leverage 
ratios are high, a firm has to pay more interests that are directly deducted from earnings than a low financial 
leverage firm. Thus, a negative relationship between ROA and LEVERAGE is expected. 
 
Third, industry mean adjusted profitability (ADJ_ROA) is included to control for a firm’s profitability 
(McGuire et al., 1988; Seifert et al., 2004). A firm’s profitability is expected to positively affect Tobin’s Q. Hence, 
the predicted sign of the coefficient is positive. 
 
Fourth, business risk (RISK) is used to control for the firm’s risk (McGuire et al., 1988; Kook & Kang, 
2011) and measured by the standard deviation of prior 5 years EBITDAix divided by total assets. We expect that risk 
can be positively associated with Tobin’s Q and ROA. One of the possible explanations is that high earnings 
volatility or high risk can be related to high returns. Hence, we predict the sign of coefficient of the RISK variable is 
positive. 
 
Fifth, corporate governance (GOVERN) is employed to control for the firm’s level of governance system 
and measured by the natural log of comprehensive governance score provided by Korea Corporate Governance 
Service. Corporate governance in Korea is considered to be important and likely to affect on the market value of the 
Korean listed firms (Black et al., 2006). Several corporate governance measures are also used in the study of the 
relationship between CSR and firm value as a control variable for the Korean public companies (C. Kim, 2009). 
Based on the review study on corporate governance with emphasis on emerging markets, Claessens and Yurtoglu 
(2013) report that better corporate governance such as ownership structures to protect outside investors and less 
deviation between cash flow and voting rights benefit firms through better performance and lower cost of capital. 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) show governance is significant and positively correlated with operating performance. 
Thus, the expected sign of the coefficients of GOVERN is positive. 
 
Sixth, firm age (FIRM_AGE) is also used in studies on firm valuation (Drobetz et al., 2004; Black et al., 
2006; C. Kim, 2009). Old firms are likely to be in a mature industry, leading to restriction of their growth potential 
and lower Tobin’s Q (Black et al., 2006). In other words, growing young firms tend to invest in intangible assets 
such as R&D and realize quick growth rate. Given that stock price is the function of growth rate, firm age thus is 
expected to be negatively associated with Tobin’s Q (Kook & Kang, 2011). We predict that firm age has a negative 
relationship with CFP. 
 
Seventh, we include industry dummy variables to control for industry effects and use KSIC (Korea 
Standard Industry Classification) two-digit industry codes (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Strike et al., 2006; Kook & 
Kang, 2011). Arlow and Gannon (1982) suggest that industry characteristics are an important factor in the study on 
CSR-CFP. Lastly, we also include five dummy variables for years to control for changes in economic conditions 
during the six years of this study (Lien & Li, 2013).  
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis 
 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of selected variables. In Table 3, Panel A presents the 
descriptive statistics of unadjusted CSR scores for each year over the sample period which shows a pretty even 
distribution. The mean value ranges from 45.03 to 45.75 over the sample period of 2005-2010. The mean of 
minimum (maximum) value of CSR score is 35.80 (57.15), whose difference is 21.35. Moreover, the descriptive 
statistics of adjusted CSR scores also show a pretty even distribution. The mean value ranges from 40.39 to 40.89. 
The mean of minimum (maximum) value of CSR score is 31.53 (51.28), whose difference is 19.75. 
 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of selected variables in the full sample. The mean 
value of CSR (ADJ_CSR) is 3.815(3.702), which is calculated by natural log of unadjusted CSR score (adjusted CSR 
score). All continuous variables except the CSR variable are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the 
problem of outliers.x The mean value of Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ) is 1.005. The mean value of operating return on asset 
(ROA) is 6.6 percent, implying that sample firms appear to be profitable in the industry. Given that sample firms are 
listed firms in Korea Stock Exchange market, this result is consistent with our expectation. 
 
For the control variables, the mean value of SIZE is 26.415, i.e. US$296 million converted using exchange 
rate of 1,000 Korean won per US 1 dollar, indicating the full sample consists of large firms in Korea due to the fact 
that KEJI offers CSR scores for selective KOSPI (Korea Composite Stock Price Index) firms. The mean values of 
financial leverage (LEVERAGE), adjusted return on asset (ADJ_ROA), and earnings volatility (RISK), and 
governance level (GOVERN) are 38.9 percent, 0.00 percent, 3.1 percent, and 4.695, respectively, indicating that 
sample firms seem to have a stable capital structure and low level of risk. 
 
Turning to the Pearson’s correlation coefficients for selected variables, TOBINQ and ROA are significant 
and positively correlated with CSR(ADJ_CSR) (0.32 (0.26) and 0.25 (0.22), p<0.01), SIZE (0.29 and 0.13, p<0.01), 
and GOVERN (0.37 and 0.21, p<0.01), observing that correlation between ADJ_CSR and CFP is lower than that 
between CSR and CFP as expected. We observe that the correlation coefficients between SIZE and GOVERN are 
0.60 (p<0.01), slightly higher than 0.50, which might cause multicollinearity. We check multicollinearity of 
independent variables in the regression models using variation inflation factors (VIF) and do not find material 
multicollinearity problem in the sample. We observe that the correlation coefficient between ROA and ADJ_ROA is 
0.65 (p<0.01), which is highly correlated. We omit the ADJ_ROA in the regression model when using ROA as a 
dependent variable. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Unadjusted and Adjusted CSR Score 
Unadjusted CSR Score 
Year n Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. 25th Percentile 
75th 
Percentile Max. 
2005 230 45.34 45.60 3.39 36.67 43.20 47.31 55.82 
2006 199 45.62 45.71 3.45 37.03 43.21 48.12 56.33 
2007 208 45.03 44.81 3.62 35.87 42.61 47.41 57.15 
2008 200 45.57 45.35 3.88 36.63 42.86 48.51 56.39 
2009 216 45.70 45.54 3.79 35.80 42.98 48.68 55.51 
2010 248 45.75 45.67 3.39 38.00 43.29 48.04 56.26 
Total 1301 45.51 45.42 3.58 35.80 43.05 48.03 57.15 
Adjusted CSR Score 
Year n Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. 25th Percentile 
75th 
Percentile Max. 
2005 230 40.39 40.58 3.11 31.82 38.57 42.22 49.40 
2006 199 40.58 40.62 3.14 31.68 38.56 42.85 50.06 
2007 208 40.60 40.48 3.27 31.56 38.53 42.75 51.28 
2008 200 40.60 40.65 3.48 32.28 38.13 43.10 49.95 
2009 216 40.76 40.44 3.42 31.53 38.57 43.35 49.34 
2010 248 40.89 40.69 3.09 33.03 38.67 42.82 49.87 
Total 1301 40.64 40.58 3.25 31.53 38.54 42.76 51.28 
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(Table 3 continued) 
Panel B. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlation Coefficients 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. TOBINQ 1.005 0.447 1      
2. ROA 0.066 0.055 0.42** 1     
3. CSR 3.815 0.079 0.32** 0.25** 1    
4. ADJ_CSR 3.702 0.080 0.26** 0.22** 0.98** 1   
5. SIZE 26.415 1.332 0.29** 0.13** 0.44** 0.40** 1  
6. LEVERAGE 0.389 0.168 0.18** -0.09** -0.23** -0.25** 0.20** 1 
7. ADJ_ROA 0.000 0.057 0.25** 0.65** 0.14** 0.12** 0.11** -0.29** 
8. RISK 0.031 0.019 0.06* 0.13** -0.12** -0.11** -0.17** 0.03 
9. GOVERN 4.695 0.197 0.37** 0.21** 0.53** 0.49** 0.60** 0.05* 
10. FIRM_AGE 3.538 0.508 -0.22** -0.08** -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.11** 
 n 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301 
 Variable Mean S.D. 7 8 9 10   
7. ADJ_ROA 0.000 0.057 1      
8. RISK 0.031 0.019 -0.04 1     
9. GOVERN 4.695 0.197 0.05 -0.15** 1    
10. FIRM_AGE 3.538 0.508 -0.03 -0.10** -0.06* 1   
 n 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301   
Pearson correlation coefficients are shown below the diagonal. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent 
levels on a two–tailed test, respectively. Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Regression Analysis 
 
We use beta coefficients (standardized coefficients) to show the results of the multivariate regressions in 
Table 4. Beta coefficients are known to help researchers interpret the extent of relative effects of independent 
variables on the dependent variable. We also calculate robust standard errors to control the heteroskedasticity 
problems that occur in our pooled OLS regression models. 
 
Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 show the results of the multivariate regression analyses. The dependent variable 
employed to measure financial performance is TOBINQ. The independent variables of interest are CSR and 
ADJ_CSR, respectively, which represent the level of CSR activities. The result of Model 1 in Table 4 shows that the 
estimated coefficient of CSR is positive and significant (0.098, p<0.01), whereas Model 2 of Table 4 presents that 
ADJ_CSR is positive and significant (0.063, p<0.05), implying that beta coefficient decreases together with the 
lower statistical significance level when ADJ_CSR is used. The result of Model 1 is consistent with prior studies (C. 
Kim, 2009; Jang & Choi, 2010; Kook & Kang, 2011) using unadjusted CSR scores in Korea setting. 
 
Turning to the control variables, in Model 1 of Table 4,xi all of the coefficients for the SIZE, LEVERAGE, 
ADJ_ROA, RISK, and GOVERN variables are significantly positive (p<0.01) as expected. These results indicate that 
larger firms, firms with higher leverage ratios, profitable firms, and firms with better corporate governance appear to 
have a positive effect on TOBINQ. Further, as expected, FIRM_AGE is significant and negatively related to 
TOBINQ. This implies that as firms get older or reach a mature stage of firm’s life cycle, they tend to negatively 
affect TOBINQ. The adjusted R2 is 0.42 for both models 1 and 2, showing reasonable explanatory powers to test our 
research question. 
 
Models 3 and 4 of Table 4 report the results of the regression analyses when the dependent variable used 
to measure financial performance is ROA. Model 3 of Table 4 shows that the coefficient (0.079, p<0.05) of CSR is 
significantly positive with ROA, which is consistent with prior study (Jang & Choi, 2010) using unadjusted CSR 
scores in Korea. However, CSR is insignificantly related to ROA in other study(J.-S. Choi et al., 2010) probably 
because of different sample period and sample selection.xii However, in Model 4 of Table 4 the coefficient of 
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ADJ_CSR is positive but insignificant (0.040, t: 1.08), implying that CSR activities are not related to firm’s 
accounting performance measure (ROA) when ADJ_CSR is used to measure the level of a firm’s CSR activities.  
 
Regarding the control variables, in Model 3 of Table 4, direction and significance of the control variables 
except LEVERAGE are similar to the results of Model 1 of Table 4 as discussed above. We discuss LEVERAGE 
variable. One possible reason why the direction of LEVERAGE is negative (coefficient: -0.071, p<0.05) is that if a 
firm’s operating performance is poor, it needs to borrow debts to do investing activities such as purchasing fixed 
assets. Conversely, if a firm’s operating performance is good, it is likely to repay debts because it has adequate fund 
to invest into buying fixed assets. The adjusted R2 values in the models are 0.20, showing reasonable explanatory 
power of the regression models to test our research question. 
 
Table 4. Regressions of Financial Performance on Unadjusted & Adjusted CSR_SCORE 
(Sample Period: 2005-2010) 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
  Dependent variables 
  TOBINQ TOBINQ  ROA ROA 
Independent variables Sign Coefficient Coefficient Sign Coefficient Coefficient (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
CSR + 0.098***  + 0.079**  
  (3.12)   (2.02)  ADJ_CSR +  0.063** +  0.040 
   (2.09)   (1.08) SIZE + 0.120*** 0.134*** + 0.101*** 0.115*** 
  (3.91) (4.44)  (2.59) (3.01) LEVERAGE + 0.302*** 0.294*** - -0.071** -0.080*** 
  (12.72) (12.26)  (-2.48) (-2.83) ADJ_ROA + 0.280*** 0.282***    
  (9.42) (9.45)    RISK + 0.094*** 0.094*** + 0.122*** 0.122*** 
  (3.71) (3.68)  (2.95) (2.93) GOVERN + 0.153*** 0.164*** + 0.057 0.068* 
  (4.92) (5.25)  (1.47) (1.76) FIRM_AGE - -0.172*** -0.174*** - -0.084*** -0.086*** 
  (-5.49) (-5.49)  (-2.84) (-2.90) Industry dummies  Included Included  Included Included Year dummies  Included Included  Included Included Mean of VIF  1.58 1.58  1.57 1.57 Adj. R2  0.42 0.42  0.20 0.20 F  34.55*** 33.93***  24.44*** 24.54*** n  1301 1301  1301 1301 *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels on a two–tailed test, respectively. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated on the basis of robust standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity at the firm and year levels. 
 
In sum, these results above in Table 4 support that among the seven individual components of KEJI CSR 
scores, the economic development contribution category plays an important role in contributing to the positive 
relationship with CFP because it is related to operating performance measures. These results suggest that researchers 
consider the importance of excluding the economic development contribution category from KEJI CSR scores (i.e., 
adjusted CSR scores) to prevent observing the spurious relationship between CSR and CFP. 
 
Sensitivity Tests 
 
In Table 4, we show the results that the relationships between CSR activities and CFP measured by 
Tobin’s Q and ROA are affected, depending on which CSR measures such as unadjusted and adjusted CSR score are 
used. Specifically, the positive relationship between CSR and CFP using unadjusted CSR score weakens compared 
to the adjusted CSR score. To secure robustness of our results, using the disclosed and undisclosed CSR scorexiii to 
the public, we perform sensitivity tests by running regression analyses using different sample periods, 2005-2009 
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and 2005-2008, respectively. In addition, given that prior studies are mostly performed using the sample data of the 
disclosed CSR score to the public, regression analyses using the disclosed CSR score to the public are performed to 
compare with prior studies and confirm whether or not the our conclusion remains unchanged. 
 
Full Sample Data of Disclosed and Undisclosed CSR Score 
 
 
Using the period of 2005-2009 data, the result of Model 1 in Table 5 shows that the estimated coefficient 
of CSR is positive and significant (0.105, p<0.01) in explaining TOBINQ consistent with the results of prior studies, 
whereas Model 2 of Table 5 presents that ADJ_CSR is positive and marginally significant (0.067, p<0.10), implying 
that beta coefficient decreases together with the lower statistical significance level when ADJ_CSR is used as an 
independent variable and TOBINQ is used as the dependent variable for CFP. Models 3 and 4 of Table 5 use ROA 
as dependent variable. The result shows that the coefficient (0.094, p<0.05) of CSR is significantly positive with 
ROA consistent with the results of prior studies, whereas Model 4 of Table 5 presents that coefficient of ADJ_CSR is 
positive but insignificant (0.044, t: 1.04), implying that CSR activities are not related to ROA when ADJ_CSR is 
used to measure the level of CSR activities. 
 
Table 5. Regressions of Financial Performance on Unadjusted & Adjusted CSR_SCORE 
(Sample Period: 2005-2009) 
  Dependent variables 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
  TOBINQ TOBINQ  ROA ROA 
Independent variables Sign Coefficient Coefficient Sign Coefficient Coefficient (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
CSR + 0.105***  + 0.094**  
  (2.91)   (2.10)  ADJ_CSR +  0.067* +  0.044 
   (1.94)   (1.04) SIZE + 0.128*** 0.143*** + 0.075* 0.094** 
  (3.73) (4.27)  (1.75) (2.24) 
LEVERAGE + 0.283*** 0.274*** - -0.051 -0.064** 
  (10.54) (10.09)  (-1.64) (-2.04) ADJ_ROA + 0.264*** 0.266***    
  (7.88) (7.92)    RISK + 0.077*** 0.077*** + 0.098** 0.099** 
  (2.73) (2.74)  (2.11) (2.12) GOVERN + 0.130*** 0.141*** + 0.049 0.062 
  (3.69) (4.00)  (1.10) (1.42) FIRM_AGE - -0.182*** -0.185*** - -0.096*** -0.099*** 
  (-5.23) (-5.25)  (-2.99) (-3.07) Industry dummies  Included Included  Included Included Year dummies  Included Included  Included Included Mean of VIF  1.58 1.58  1.57 1.57 Adj. R2  0.42 0.42  0.21 0.21 F  23.99*** 23.71***  9.82*** 9.65*** n  1053 1053  1053 1053 *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels on a two–tailed test, respectively. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated on the basis of robust standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity at the firm and year levels. 
 
Using the period of 2005-2008 data, the result of Model 1 of Table 6 reports that the coefficient of CSR is 
positive and marginally significant (0.073, p<0.10), whereas Model 2 of Table 6 presents that ADJ_CSR is positive 
but insignificant (0.040, t: 1.02), implying that CSR activities measured by ADJ_CSR are not significantly related to 
Tobin’s Q. Model 3 of Table 6 shows that the coefficient (0.121, p<0.05) of CSR is significantly positive with ROA, 
whereas Model 4 of Table 6 presents that coefficient of ADJ_CSR is positive but insignificant (0.063, t: 1.34), 
suggesting that CSR activities (ADJ_CSR) are not related to ROA. 
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In sum, we confirm that the results using the sample data of disclosed and undisclosed CSR score to the 
public are consistent with prior studies using unadjusted CSR score. We also report that the relationship between 
CSR and CFP significantly weakens when ADJ_CSR is used. 
 
Table 6. Regressions of Financial Performance on Unadjusted & Adjusted CSR_SCORE 
(Sample Period: 2005-2008) 
  Dependent variables 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
  TOBINQ TOBINQ  ROA ROA 
Independent variables Sign Coefficient Coefficient Sign Coefficient Coefficient (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
CSR + 0.073*  + 0.121**  
  (1.79)   (2.44)  ADJ_CSR +  0.040 +  0.063 
   (1.02)   (1.34) SIZE + 0.130*** 0.143*** + 0.096** 0.118** 
  (3.52) (3.95)  (2.01) (2.53) LEVERAGE + 0.285*** 0.278*** - -0.039 -0.054 
  (9.47) (9.07)  (-1.06) (-1.45) ADJ_ROA + 0.262*** 0.264***    
  (6.93) (6.93)    RISK + 0.060** 0.061** + 0.112** 0.114** 
  (2.03) (2.06)  (2.21) (2.23) GOVERN + 0.117*** 0.127*** + 0.012 0.030 
  (3.00) (3.26)  (0.24) (0.58) FIRM_AGE - -0.187*** -0.190*** - -0.083** -0.087** 
  (-4.85) (-4.88)  (-2.32) (-2.44) Industry dummies  Included Included  Included Included Year dummies  Included Included  Included Included Mean of VIF  1.62 1.62  1.63 1.62 Adj. R2  0.43 0.43  0.22 0.22 F  20.47*** 20.34***  8.64*** 8.43*** n  837 837  837 837 *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels on a two–tailed test, respectively. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated on the basis of robust standard errors 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity at the firm and year levels. 
 
Sample Data of Disclosed CSR Score 
 
Using the period of 2005-2010 data, in Panel A of Table 7, the result of Model 1 shows that the estimated 
coefficient of CSR is positive and significant (0.086, p<0.05) in explaining TOBINQ consistent with the results of 
prior studies. On the other hand, Model 2 presents that ADJ_CSR is positive but insignificant (0.046, p>0.10). CSR 
activities are not related to TOBINQ when ADJ_CSR is used to measure the level of CSR activities. Models 3 and 4 
use ROA as dependent variable. The result shows that the coefficient (0.123, p<0.01) of CSR is significantly positive 
with ROA, consistent with the results of prior studies. However, the coefficient of ADJ_CSR is positive and 
marginally significant (0.076, p<0.10), implying that CSR activities are not related to ROA when ADJ_CSR is used 
to measure the level of CSR activities, implying that beta coefficient decreases together with the lower statistical 
significance level when ADJ_CSR is used as an independent variable and ROA is used as the dependent variable for 
CFP. 
 
Using the period of 2005-2009 data, in Panel B of Table 7, the result of Model 1 shows that the estimated 
coefficient of CSR is positive and significant (0.079, p<0.10) in explaining TOBINQ, whereas Model 2 presents that 
ADJ_CSR is positive but insignificant (0.036, p>0.10). Models 3 and 4 use ROA as dependent variable. The result of 
Model 3 shows that the coefficient (0.129, p<0.05) of CSR is significantly positive with ROA, whereas the result of 
Model 4 reports that the coefficient of ADJ_CSR is positive but insignificant (0.074, p>0.10). These results imply 
that CSR activities are not related to TOBINQ and ROA when ADJ_CSR is used. Using the period of 2005-2008 
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data, In Panel C of Table 7, the results remain qualitatively unchanged. Considering the sample size is smaller, we 
omit reporting and interpreting of the results. 
 
In sum, we confirm that using the sample data of disclosed CSR score to the public the results are 
consistent with prior studies using unadjusted CSR score. We also observe that the relationship between CSR and 
CFP significantly weakens when ADJ_CSR is used. 
 
Table 7. Regressions of Financial Performance on Unadjusted & Adjusted CSR_SCORE 
Using sample of disclosed CSR score to the public 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
  Dependent variables 
  TOBINQ TOBINQ  ROA ROA 
Independent variables Sign Coefficient Coefficient Sign Coefficient Coefficient (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) (t-stat) 
Panel A: Sample period: 2005-2010 
CSR + 0.086**  + 0.123***  
  (2.27)   (2.63)  ADJ_CSR +  0.046 +  0.076* 
   (1.31)   (1.72) Adj. R2  0.43 0.43  0.23 0.22 n  812 812  812 812 Panel B: Sample period: 2005-2009 
CSR + 0.079*  + 0.129**  
  (1.84)   (2.39)  ADJ_CSR +  0.036 +  0.074 
   (0.91)   (1.45) Adj. R2  0.42 0.42  0.24 0.23 n  667 667  667 667 Panel C: Sample period: 2005-2008 
CSR + 0.044  + 0.183***  
  (0.96)   (3.39)  ADJ_CSR +  0.012 +  0.110** 
   (0.29)   (2.15) Adj. R2  0.43 0.43  0.27 0.26 n  533 533  533 533 Control variables  Included Included  Included Included Industry dummies  Included Included  Included Included Year dummies  Included Included  Included Included *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels on a two–tailed test, respectively. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. All test statistics and significance levels are calculated on the basis of robust standard 
errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity at the firm and year levels. Control variables are not shown because the results are similar 
to those in Table 4. Each regression model includes control variables, industry dummies, and year dummies. 
 
Summary of Empirical Results 
 
Table 8 summarizes the empirical results when the unadjusted and adjusted CSR scores are used. In Panel 
A of Table 8, using the sample of disclosed and undisclosed CSR score when we use unadjusted CSR score, the 
coefficients on CSR for TOBINQ are positive and significant in all sample periods (0.098, p<0.01; 0.105, p<0.01, 
and 0.073, p<0.10, respectively) supporting the results of prior studies. However, when adjusted CSR score is used, 
the coefficients on CSR for TOBINQ are positive but smaller, and the significance level gets weaker or insignificant 
in all sample periods (0.063, p<0.05; 0.067, p<0.10, and 0.040, p>0.10, respectively) suggesting that adjusted CSR 
score weakens the positive relationship between CSR and Tobin’s Q compared to unadjusted CSR score as expected. 
Moreover, in Panel B, Table 8, based on the sample of disclosed CSR score, we confirm that the results of adjusted 
CSR score (0.086, p<0.05; 0.079, p<0.10; 0.044, p>0.10, respectively) weakens the positive relationship between 
CSR and Tobin’s Q compared to those of unadjusted CSR score (0.046, p>0.10; 0.036, p>0.10; 0.012, p>0.10, 
respectively) as predicted. 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – November/December 2015 Volume 31, Number 6 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 2180 The Clute Institute 
When we use the unadjusted CSR score, the coefficients of CSR on ROA are positive and significant in all 
sample periods (0.079, p<0.05; 0.094, p<0.05, and 0.121, p<0.05, respectively) which are also supporting the results 
of prior studies. However, when adjusted CSR score is used, the coefficients of CSR on ROA are positive but 
smaller, and the significance level gets insignificant in all sample periods (0.040, p>0.10; 0.044, p>0.10, and 0.063, 
p>0.10, respectively), implying that adjusted CSR score significantly weakens the positive relationship between 
CSR and ROA compared to unadjusted CSR score. In addition, in Panel B, Table 8, based on the sample of 
disclosed CSR score, we confirm that the results of adjusted CSR score (0.123, p<0.01; 0.129, p<0.05, and 0.183, 
p<0.01, respectively) weakens the positive relationship between CSR and ROA compared to those of unadjusted 
CSR score (0.076, p<0.10; 0.074, p>0.10, and 0.110, p<0.05, respectively) as expected. 
 
Taken together, we confirm that potential measurement problem in unadjusted CSR scores in testing the 
CSR-CFP relation seems to exaggerate the positive relationship between CSR and CFP. Specifically, unadjusted 
CSR scores make the relationship between CSR and CFP more positive than adjusted CSR scores because 
unadjusted KEJI CSR score includes operating performance measures that are highly correlated with CFP. 
 
Table 8. Summary of empirical results 
Panel A. Full sample data including disclosed and undisclosed CSR score to the public 
  
Sample period 
2005-2010 2005-2009 2005-2008 
Independent variable Dependent variable: TOBINQ 
CSR 0.098*** 0.105*** 0.073* 
ADJ_CSR 0.063** 0.067* 0.040 
Independent variable Dependent variable: ROA 
CSR 0.079** 0.094** 0.121** 
ADJ_CSR 0.040 0.044 0.063 
n 1,301 1,053 837 
Panel B. Sample data including disclosed CSR score to the public 
  
Sample period 
2005-2010 2005-2009 2005-2008 
Independent variable Dependent variable: TOBINQ 
CSR 0.086** 0.079* 0.044 
ADJ_CSR 0.046 0.036 0.012 
Independent variable Dependent variable: ROA 
CSR 0.123*** 0.129** 0.183*** 
ADJ_CSR 0.076* 0.074 0.110** 
n 812 667 533 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels on a two–tailed test, respectively. 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we examine whether CSR activities are really profitable by enhancing firm value and 
increase ROA when adjusted CSR score is used. Considering KEJI index is widely used in the studies that explore 
the relationship between CSR and CFP in Korea setting, we investigate whether the original CSR score measured by 
KEJI index results in upward bias in the relationship between CSR and CFP due to potential measurement problem. 
In business practice, whether or not CSR is positively associated with CFP is an important issue for a firm’s 
managers. If CSR is positively related to CFP, managers are motivated to pursue CSR activities proactively. In 
contrast, if CSR is negatively associated with CFP, managers need to be cautious to invest in CSR activities. Given 
CSR score is an important factor in the relationship between CSR and CFP, it is meaningful to explore the potential 
measurement problem of KEJI CSR score. To do this we employ adjusted CSR score obtained by excluding the 
performance-related component (i.e. economic development contribution) from the original CSR score to see the 
degree of distortion in the positive CSR-CFP relation when the original (unadjusted) CSR score is used. 
 
CSR activities are measured using unadjusted and adjusted CSR scores based on KEJI index to compare 
both empirical results. CFP is measured using Tobin’s Q and ROA widely employed in the prior studies. Using a 
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sample of 1,301 firm-year observations of Korean manufacturing public firms during the period of 2005-2010, the 
results show that adjusted CSR score excluding operating performance component from KEJI index significantly 
weakens the positive relationship between CSR and CFP compared to unadjusted CSR score in Korea, suggesting 
that researchers and managers reconsider the importance of using the proper CSR measure depending on the 
research question of interest. 
 
Like all empirical studies, our study has several limitations. First, as pointed out by Waddock and Graves 
(1997) in the CSR studies, this study still might have measurement problem issues even though we use adjusted 
CSR scores. Second, we restrict the sample to listed manufacturing firms in KOSPI market because KEJI provide 
only KOSPI firms with CSR scores. One should be careful to apply this result to small and medium (SME) firms. 
 
Despite these limitations, we believe that the results of this study have important implications for 
managers and researchers. First, it is meaningful for managers to recognize that the positive CSR-CFP relationship 
reported in the majority of prior studies seem to be exaggerated and can be discounted to some extent due to the 
potential measurement problem in the original CSR scores used in those studies.  
 
Second, to researchers, this study suggests that measurement problem of CSR score might distort the 
relationship between two variables. That is, operating performance component included in CSR score causes to 
produce a positive upward bias to the CSR-CFP relationship due to the high positive correlation between operating 
performance component and CFP. In particular, our main results show that the relationship between CSR and CFP 
significantly weakens when we use adjusted CSR score correcting measurement problem. This finding is strongly 
supported by sensitive tests using top 200 CSR scores firms mostly used in prior studies. Thus, this finding is likely 
to help researchers interpret conservatively or differently the previous results of CSR-CFP relationship, which used 
unadjusted CSR score.  
 
In conclusion, this study drives researchers to recognize the importance of appropriate measurement of 
CSR activities to examine the relationship between CSR and CFP. Therefore, when they investigate the relationship 
between CSR and CFP using previous KEJI CSR score data including the periods before 2010 on the fiscal year 
basis, we strongly suggest that they use adjusted CSR score to measure the level of CSR activities in Korea. Then, 
assuming using adjusted CSR score, we want to ask again, “Is CSR really profitable in Korea?” 
 
In future study, they may extend this research by finding other measurement problems of CSR score to 
explain the reasons of mixed or biased results of CSR-CFP relationship. CSR score and performance measurement 
issues between CSR and CFP need to be revisited in more detail. 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables 
TOBINQ (market value of common and preferred stock + long term liabilities) / book value of total assets, at 
fiscal year-end in period t; and 
ROA operating income divided by total assets at fiscal year-end in period t. 
Variable of Interest 
CSR natural logarithm of unadjusted total CSR score measured by KEJI Index (detailed information is 
provided in Appendix B); and 
ADJ_CSR natural logarithm of adjusted CSR score (unadjusted total score – economic development 
contribution included in unadjusted total CSR score). 
Control Variables 
SIZE natural logarithm of total asset; 
LEVERAGE total liability / total assets; 
ADJ_ROA industry mean–adjusted ROA in the previous year (ROA = income before extraordinary items / 
lagged total assets); 
RISK standard deviation of prior 5 years EBITDA/total assets1);  
FIRM AGE natural logarithm of (1 + the number of years since the firm's establishment); 
GOVERN natural logarithm of governance score provided by Korea Corporate Governance Service; 
IND industry dummy based on two-digit Korea standard industry classification code; and 
YEAR year dummy. 
Other Variables 
ECONO_CONT economic development contribution components included in KEJI index (detailed information is 
provided in Appendix B). 
1) EBITDA=Earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
 
 
Appendix B. KEJI Index Measurement 
Item (Score) Subsection Score 
Soundness of capital structure (20) 
Soundness of shareholder's composition 7 
Soundness of investment expenditures 3 
Soundness of capital financing 10 
Fairness of trades (11) Fair trade  3 Transparency 8 
Social contribution (7) Protection of underprivileged class of people 4 Social contribution 3 
Customer protection & satisfaction (7) 
Protection of consumer right 2 
Product quality 3 
Advertisement expenditure 2 
Environmental protection activity (10) 
Environmental improvement 4 
Environmental friendly policy 3 
Violation and pollution 3 
Employee satisfaction (10) 
Health and safety of workplace 2 
Investment of human resource 4 
Wage and welfare 4 
Economic development contribution (10)1 Research and development efforts 3 Business performance and contribution to economic growth  7 
Total           75 
Source: KEJI (2011) (translated in English) 
1. Economic development contribution (10 points) specifically consists of research and development expenditure (2 points), 
patents (1 point), profitability (1 point), growth (1 point), equipment investment (1 point), tax payment (1 point), dividend 
payout ratio (1 point), labor productivity increase rate (1 point), and export contribution (1 point). 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                
i Economic development contribution (10 points) specifically consists of research and development expenditure (2 
points), patents (1 point), profitability (1 point), growth (1 point), equipment investment (1 point), tax payment (1 
point), dividend payout ratio (1 point), labor productivity increase rate (1 point), and export contribution (1 point). 
ii MSCI KLD 400 Social Index consisting of 400 companies selected from the MSCI USA Investable Market Index 
(IMI) also contains 5 categories: environment, community and society, employee and supply chain, customers, and 
governance and ethics. Website: http://www.msci.com/resources/products/indexes/thematic/esg/MSCI_KLD_ 
400_Social_Index_Methodology_Feb2011.pdf 
iii KEJI provides CSR scores only to KOSPI firms. 
iv Freeman (1984, p. 46) defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the 
achievement of a corporation’s purpose. Stakeholders include employees, customers, suppliers, stockholders, banks, 
environmentalists, government, and other groups who can help or hurt the corporation.” 
v KEJI discloses just the 200 top CSR score firms annually to the public. However, we use the CSR scores of more 
than 300 firms each year that include undisclosed firms to enhance better construct validity for the empirical results 
by securing larger sample as best as we can. 
vi Economic development contribution (ECONOMIC) (10 points) specifically consists of research and development 
expenditure (2 points), patents (1 point), profitability (1 point), growth (1 point), equipment investment (1 point), tax 
payment (1 point), dividend payout ratio (1 point), labor productivity increase rate (1 point), and export contribution 
(1 point). 
vii In this study, we measure CSR activities by converting CSR score into natural logarithm of CSR score to scale 
down to align with other variables. 
viii NICE GROUP, previously known as National Information & Credit Evaluation was founded in 1986 and started 
a comprehensive credit information service in 1989 for the first time in Korea. It signed strategic agreement on joint 
development of global platform with D&B (Dun & Bradstreet) (NICE GROUP Website 
http://eng.nice.co.kr/main.nice). 
ix EBITDA stands for earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
x We also conduct the regression analysis using unwinsorized variables, resulting in similar results, which are not 
shown in this paper. 
xi Since the results of control variables in Model 1 are almost the same as that of Model 2, We only interpret the 
coefficient of control variables in Model 1. 
xii The sample in the prior studies (J.-S. Choi et al., 2010; Heo & Chung, 2010; Jang & Choi, 2010; Y Kim & Wee, 
2011; Na & Hong, 2011) include 200 firms whose CSR data is disclosed to the public, whereas we use more than 
300 firms in the sample that includes both disclosed and undisclosed firms to the public. Moreover, the different, 
extended, and recent sample period of 2005-2010 seems to be related to different results. In addition, different 
sampling methods that restrict the sample data to the manufacturing industry may cause to have different results 
(refer to Table 1). 
xiii KEJI discloses CSR scores for only 200 firms even if they have CSR scores for more than 300 firms because 
firms rated by low CSR scores may face a reputational risk, resulting in damage to their firm value. Considering 
CSR activities are voluntary, KEJI might decide not to punish but to encourage CSR activities by announcing firms 
rated by somewhat higher CSR scores, namely top 200 firms. 
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